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From open learners to open games
Technical report
Jules Hedges
The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuye´ras) and
open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a
very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is
to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the for-
mer to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without
feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a
canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player,
and the game’s best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient de-
scent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.
1 Introduction
We give an overview of the motivation for open learners and open games, but for the
formal definitions and more context we refer the reader to [FST17] for open learners
and [GHWZ18] for open games. We will use the notation of both of those papers. More
detail on open games can be found in [Hed16, Hed18].
An open learner X → Y is a supervised learning system that learns a function X → Y
by being presented with a sequence of pairs (x, y). This function is determined by a
set of parameters, which are updated each time a new (x, y) pair is presented. Open
learners are very general, but contain neural networks (at least, those consisting simply
of a finite sequence of layers) as a special case by explicitly encoding backpropagation
and gradient descent. Open learners form the morphisms of a symmetric monoidal
category Learn whose objects are sets, where categorical composition and monoidal
product correspond to sequential and parallel composition of learning systems, which
includes end-to-end and side-by-side composition of neural networks as a special case.
The resulting compositionality of the backpropagation and gradient descent semantics
is the main motivation for studying open learners.
An open game
(
X
S
)
→
(
Y
R
)
is a fragment of a non-cooperative game that starts in an
initial state X that players can (potentially) observe, and with their choices determining
a final state in Y . Players act rationally (in the sense of classical game theory) in order
to optimise a value in R (which is typically Rn with each player attempting to maximise
one coordinate), and a ‘co-value’ in S is passed back to act as the value for players in
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the past. Instead of parameters we have strategies for players, and instead of updating
parameters we have a ‘best response’ relation on strategy profiles. In general this cannot
be viewed as a dynamics (in the sense that iterating it is not an interesting thing to
do), but we are interested in fixpoints of it, which are Nash equilibria, or mutually non-
self-defeating choices of strategies. Open games form the morphisms of a symmetric
monoidal category Game whose objects are pairs of sets, where categorical composition
and monoidal product correspond to sequential and parallel play.
Whereas parameter updating of an open learner takes place in the ‘context’ of a pair
(x, y), best response of an open game takes place in the context of a pair (x, k) where
x ∈ X is the initial state and k : Y → R is the ‘continuation’. This k contains strictly
more information than a single point y; specifically it encodes counterfactuals, saying
what the payoffs would be if some other choices had been made. From a categorical
point of view, this prevents our functor from being full. We suggest that this is the sole
significant distinction between (elementary) machine learning and (elementary) game
theory.
Acknowledgements. The proof of functorality was sketched by the author and David
Spivak around a year before this note was written. The author would also like to thank
too many people to name for discussions about this topic, after spending a year telling
anybody who would listen about it, with special mention for Neil Ghani, Mike Johnson
and Eliana Lorch.
2 From open learners to open games
Recall the definition of an open learner X → Y [FST17, definition 2.1] and the definition
of an open game
(
X
S
)
→
(
Y
R
)
[GHWZ18, definition 3.1].
Definition 1. Given an open learner A = (PA, IA, UA, rA) : X → Y , we define an open
game F (A) :
(
X
X
)
→
(
Y
Y
)
as follows:
• The set of strategy profiles is ΣF (A) = PA
• The play function is PF (A) = IA
• The coplay function is CF (A) = rA
• The best response relation BF (A)(h, k) = {(p, UA(p, h, k(IA(p, h)))) | p ∈ PA}
Notice that there is an exact correspondence between parameters/strategies, imple-
mentation/play and request/coplay. The only nontrivial part of this definition is con-
verting update to best response, which also uses implementation. This means that
throughout this note there is nothing to prove except for the final case, which neverthe-
less takes some work.
Notice in particular that the relation BF (A)(h, k) is always a functional relation, i.e.
every p ∈ PA is related to exactly one thing, namely UA(p, h, k(IA(p, h))).
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In both Learn and Game, morphisms are formally defined as equivalence classes.1
Recall the definitions of equivalence of open learners [FST17, section 2] and equivalence
of open games [GHWZ18, definition 5.2]. There is a small error in the definition of
equivalence of open learners as currently written in [FST17], which does not type-check.
The correct equation for update should be
U
′(f(p), a, b) = f(U(p, a, b))
Proposition 1. F is well-defined on equivalence classes.
Proof. Let A ∼ B : X → Y be equivalent games, so there is a bijection i : PA → PB
that respects implementation, update and request. Immediately i : ΣF (PA) → ΣF (PB)
respects play and coplay, so we need only check that it respects best response. For h : X
and k : Y → Y , we have that (p, p′) ∈ BF (A)(h, k) iff
p
′ = UA(p, h, k(IA(p, h)))
iff
i(p′) = i(UA(p, h, k(IA(p, h)))) = UB(i(p), h, k(IB (i(p), h)))
(since i is a bijection), iff (i(p), i(p′)) ∈ BF (B)(h, k). Hence F (A) ∼ F (B).
3 Categorical structure
Recall the definition of identity morphisms in Learn [FST17, section 2] and Game
[GHWZ18, definition 5.5].
Proposition 2. F takes identities in Learn to identities in Game.
Proof. Let idX : X → X be an identity in Learn. Then the best response relation
BF (idX) : X × (X → X)→ P(1 × 1) is
BF (idX)(h, k) = {(∗, UidX (∗, h, k(h)))} = {(∗, ∗)} = Bid(XX)
(h, k)
as required.
Recall the definition of categorical composition of open learners [FST17, section 2]
and open games [GHWZ18, definition 5.1].
Proposition 3. F defines a functor F : Learn→ Game.
1
Both open learners and open games naturally form monoidal bicategories with the monoidal categories
being the result of quotienting by invertible 2-cells. Both [FST17] and [GHWZ18] mention this
explicitly, and for open games the details are worked out in [Hed18].
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Proof. Take a composable pair of open learners, A = (PA, IA, UA, rA) : X → Y and
B = (PB , IB , UB , rB) : Y → Z. The open learner B ◦ A : X → Z has update function
UB◦A : (PA × PB)×X × Z → PA × PB
UB◦A((p, q), x, z) = (UA(p, x, rB(q, IA(p, x), z)), UB(q, IA(p, x), z))
The open game F (B ◦ A) :
(
X
X
)
→
(
Z
Z
)
has best response relation
BF (B◦A) : X × (Z → Z)→ P((PA × PB)× (PA × PB))
BF (B◦A)(h, k)
= {((p, q), UB◦A((p, q), h, k(IB◦A((p, q), h)))) | p ∈ PA, q ∈ PB}
= {((p, q), UB◦A((p, q), h, k(IB (q, IA(p, h))))) | p ∈ PA, q ∈ PB}
= {((p, q), (UA(p, h, rB(q, IA(p, h), k(IB(q, IA(p, h))))),
UB(q, IA(p, h), k(IB(q, IA(p, h)))))) | p ∈ PA, q ∈ PB}
On the other hand, the open game F (A) :
(
X
X
)
→
(
Y
Y
)
has best response relation
BF (A) : X × (Y → Y )→ P(PA × PA)
BF (A)(h, k) = {(p, UA(p, h, k(IA(p, h)))) | p ∈ PA}
and the open game F (B) :
(
Y
Y
)
→
(
Z
Z
)
has best response relation
BF (B) : Y × (Z → Z)→ P(PB × PB)
BF (B)(h, k) = {(q, UB(q, h, k(IB(q, h)))) | q ∈ PB}
Putting these together, the open game F (B) ◦ F (A) :
(
X
X
)
→
(
Z
Z
)
has best response
relation
BF (B)◦F (A) : X × (Z → Z)→ P((PA × PB)× (PA × PB))
BF (B)◦F (A)(h, k)
= {((p, q), (p′, q′)) | (p, p′) ∈ BF (A)(h, k
′) and (q, q′) ∈ BF (B)(IA(p, h), k)}
where k′ : Y → Y is given by k′(y) = rB(q, y, k(IB(q, y))). This expands to the set of
((p, q), (p′, q′)) where
p
′ = UA(p, h, rB(q, IA(p, h), k(IB(q, IA(p, h)))))
and
q
′ = UB(q, IA(p, h), k(IB(q, IA(p, h)))))
Comparing to the above, we see that BF (B)◦F (A)(h, k) = BF (B◦A)(h, k).
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Proposition 4. F is faithful.
Proof. Let A,B : X → Y be open learners. We show that if there is an equivalence of
open games F (A) ∼ F (B) then there is an equivalence of open learners A ∼ B. Suppose
we have such a bijection i : PA → PB . It immediately respects implementation and
request. For any p ∈ PA, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , define k : Y → Y by k(y
′) = y. Then
(p, UA(p, x, y)) = (p, UA(p, x, k(IA(p, x)))) ∈ BF (A)(x, k)
Since F (A) ∼ F (B) it follows that (i(p), i(UA(p, x, y))) ∈ BF (B)(x, k). We also have
(i(p), UB(i(p), x, y)) = (i(p), UB(i(p), x, k(IB(i(p), x)))) ∈ BF (B)(x, k)
Since BF (B)(x, k) is a functional relation, we deduce that i(UA(p, x, y)) = UB(i(p), x, y).
This proves that A ∼ B.
4 Monoidal structure
Proposition 5. For any open learners A,B, F (A⊗B) = F (A)⊗ F (B).
Proof. Suppose that A = X → Y and B : W → Z. Again, it is only necessary to check
update/best response.
The update function of A⊗B is
UA⊗B : (PA × PB)× (X ×W )× (Y × Z)→ PA × PB
UA⊗B((p, q), (x,w), (y, z)) = (UA(p, x, y), UB(q, w, z))
Then the best response relation of F (A⊗B) is
BF (A⊗B) : (X ×W )× (Y × Z → Y × Z)→ P((PA × PB)× (PA × PB))
BF (A⊗B)((x,w), k) = {((p, q), (UA(p, x, y), UB(q, w, z)))
| p ∈ PA, q ∈ PB , (y, z) = k(IA(p, x), IB(q, w))}
On the other hand, F (A) :
(
X
X
)
→
(
Y
Y
)
has best response relation
BF (A) : X × (Y → Y )→ P(PA × PA)
BF (A)(x, k) = {(p, UA(p, x, k(IA(p, x)))) | p ∈ PA}
and F (B) :
(
W
W
)
→
(
Z
Z
)
has best response relation
BF (B) :W × (Z → Z)→ (PB → P(PB))
BF (B)(w, k) = {(q, UB(q, w, k(IB(q, w)))) | q ∈ PB}
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Then F (A)⊗ F (B) :
(
X×W
X×W
)
→
(
Y×Z
Y×Z
)
has best response function
BF (A)⊗F (B) : (X ×W )× (Y × Z → Y × Z)→ (PA × PB → P(PA × PB))
BF (A)⊗F (B)((x,w), k)(σ, τ) = BF (A)(x, k1)(σ) ×BF (B)(w, k2)(τ)
where k1 : Y → Y is given by k1(y) = pi1(k(y, IB(τ, w))), and k2 : Z → Z is given by
k2(z) = pi2(k(IA(σ, x), z)). This expands to
{UA(σ, x, k1(IA(σ, x)))} × {UB(τ, w, k2(IB(τ, w)))}
= {UA(σ, x, pi1(k(IA(σ, x), IB(τ, w))))} × {UB(τ, w, pi2(k(IA(σ, x), IB(τ, w))))}
= {(UA(σ, x, pi1(k(IA(σ, x), IB(τ, w)))), UB (τ, w, pi2(k(IA(σ, x), IB(τ, w)))))}
as required.
Proposition 6. F is a strict symmetric monoidal functor.
Proof. F takes the structure morphisms of Learn to structure morphisms ofGame.
In compositional game theory, particular emphasis is placed on a certain family of
open games εX :
(
X
X
)
→ I known as counits. Recall their definition [GHWZ18, definition
4.5].
Proposition 7. Counits are in the image of F .
Proof. For each set X consider the open learner !X : X → 1 with set of parameters P!X =
1 and request function r!X (∗, x, ∗) = x. (The implementation and update functions both
have codomain 1, and hence are trivial.) We see immediately that F (!X) = εX .
5 Outlook
We have presented a formal connection between machine learning and game theory, and
as such, it suggests applications of each to the other. Above all, the link is in need
of attention from somebody knowledgeable about machine learning from an applied
perspective.
After several pages of theory, we re-state in English what we have: a canonical way
to view any (sufficiently simple) neural network (and more general learning algorithms)
as a fragment of a game. Each parameter to be learned acts as though it is controlled
by one player, and the best response relation encodes parameter updating. Note that
for games in general the best response relation should not be thought of as a ‘dynamics’,
and iterating it will typically not converge to equilibrium, however games that result
from learning algorithms do have an interesting best response dynamics.
1. What sort of games can arise from neural networks and other learning algorithms?
Can techniques from game theory become useful in their analysis?
6
2. A player observing a value x and choosing a value y in order to maximise a real
number is represented by an open game of type
(
X
1
)
→
(
Y
R
)
. These open games
are ‘monolithic’, i.e. they are taken as generators that can label boxes in string
diagrams, and their definition involves the argmax operator. (This is precisely the
place that optimisation of real numbers enters compositional game theory.) Is it
possible to decompose players as a learning algorithm with F applied, and then pre-
and post-composed with some ‘plumbing’ to give it the correct type? For example,
can we take a neural network with m inputs and n outputs, represented as an open
learner N : Rm → Rn, and then choose functions f : X → Rm, g : Rn → Y and
h : Rn × R→ Rn (lifted to zero-player open games) such that
X f
F (N)
g Y
h R
R
m
R
m
R
n R
n
R
n
R
n
is a useful representation of a player who can learn?
3. The author implemented in Haskell the Cournot duopoly open game from [HSWZ16,
section 4.4] but with the players’ “best response” functions were co-opted to per-
form a single step of gradient descent (with a very naive numerical implementation)
rather than argmax. Iterating the resulting best response of the composite was
found to converge rapidly to the market equilibrium. This was inspired by the
link with open learners, but was not formally an example of it. Can it be made
into a formal example, and does this suggest good ways to structure equilibrium-
approximating programs?
4. Can this idea be used to put game theory on a more realistic foundation with
players who learn in a similar way to humans, without throwing away all of the
benefits of having a theory at all?
5. Does this give us a way to formalise endogenous learning agents in an economic
model [BW13, section 4]?
6. It is well-known that Nash equilibria and many other notions of economic equilib-
rium can be intractable to calculate (the field of algorithmic game theory studies
this). Can we use the ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of deep learning to cheat com-
plexity theory and efficiently approximate equilibria in real examples?
7. GANs (generative adversarial networks) have achieved enormous success for ma-
chine learning tasks such as image generation. A GAN consists of two deep neural
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networks, the generator and the discriminator, with a strong intuition that they
are playing a zero-sum game against each other [GPAM+14, OSGP+17]. Can
we formalise this intuition by embedding the two neural networks into a game-
theoretic situation that is itself not a neural network? (Note that substituting into
a game-theoretic situation is precisely the sort of thing that can be made precise
using open games.)
8. Can we systematically design more general GAN-like machine learning systems,
for example having two networks playing a non-zero-sum game, or having more
than two networks interacting? Can analysis techniques from game theory help
guide us to designs that have the properties we want?
9. By designing games whose players are learning agents implementing using neural
networks, can we achieve a ‘best of all words’ hybrid theory combining game theory,
multiagent systems and machine learning?
10. Finally, a purely theoretical problem: to simplify and modularise the proof given
here. Open games can be factorised in terms of lenses [Hed18], and a similar
factorisation is possible for open learners (work in progress by Brendan Fong and
Mike Johnson). However the functor F does not respect these two factorisations.
As a result the author was unable to find a good way to modularise the proofs
given in this paper, and instead presented them monolithically and ad-hoc, which
is unsatisfying.
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